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Abstract: The ubiquitous use of Internet of Things (IoT) ranges from industrial control systems to e-Health, e-commerce,
smart cities, supply chain management, smart cars, cyber-physical systems and a lot more. However, the
data collected and processed by IoT systems especially the ones with centralized control are vulnerable to
availability, integrity, and privacy threats. Hence, we present “PrivySharing,” a blockchain-based innovative
framework for integrity and privacy-preserving IoT data sharing in a smart city environment. The proposed
scheme is distinct from existing technologies on many aspects. The data privacy is preserved by dividing
the blockchain network into various channels, where every channel processes a specific type of data such as
health, smart car, smart energy or financial data. Moreover, access to user data within a channel is controlled
by embedding access control rules in the smart contracts. In addition, users' data within a channel is further
isolated and secured by using private data collection. Likewise, the REST API that enables clients to interact
with the blockchain network has dual security in the form of an API Key and OAuth 2.0. The proposed
solution also conforms to some of the significant requirements outlined in the European Union General Data
Protection Regulation. Lastly, we present a system of reward in the form of a digital token “PrivyCoin” for
the users for sharing their data with the stakeholders/third parties.
1 INTRODUCTION
IoT-based services are expected to connect 30 bil-
lion devices by 2020 (Lund et al., 2014). Use of
IoT technologies will not only improve the quality of
life of people but also contribute to the world econ-
omy. However, at the same time global urban pop-
ulation is also predicted to reach 5 billion by 2030.
This rapid urbanization demands effective, and op-
timum use of city resources as well as smart gover-
nance and efficient service delivery (Moustaka et al.,
2018; Zhang et al., 2017). It is believed that the solu-
tion to the rapid urbanization problems lies in creat-
ing smart cities that utilize IoT technologies to mon-
itor the physical world in real-time and provide in-
telligent services. These services may include eToll,






police assistance (Moustaka et al., 2018).
Concurrently, IoT devices are vulnerable to a vast
number of security and privacy attacks (Makhdoom
et al., 2018). Although, these threats are known to
the manufacturers but security in IoT devices is either
neglected or treated as an afterthought (Wurm et al.,
2016). Sequel to this, a smart city network also suffers
from numerous security and privacy issues (Moustaka
et al., 2018; Bartoli et al., 2011), such as threats to pri-
vacy, integrity, and availability of user data, false data
injection (Zhang et al., 2017), vulnerability to Sybil
Attack (Cui et al., 2018), and single point of failure
due to centralized control.
If we look at Figure-1, the user data collected by
numerous sensors is stored and processed by various
OSN (Online Social Networks), smart city control
centre or various other smart city components such
as Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), health
emergency response, fire and rescue etc., These com-
ponents with mostly centralized control process user
data for provision of various services to the users and
third parties. Although such a centralized control may
look effective from the outside, yet it has some signif-
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Figure 1: Issues in the smart city environment.
icant security concerns.
Centralized control is subject to a single point of
failure in case of a cyber-attack or other technical mal-
functions (Puthal et al., 2016). Moreover, it also has
trust issues, as the users have to put their trust in the
entity that is handling their data. Hence, users have
no control over their data assets. Further concerns for
user data include: Users do not know where their data
is stored? Who has access to it? Is their any unautho-
rized disclosure to the third parties? These concerns
are very realistic as the disclosure of personal data
leakage concerning 87 million users by Facebook Inc.
in April 2018 (Sara and Michael, 2018) and a bug in
Google Plus (Sara, 2018) that resulted in the exposure
of personal information of approx 500,000 users is a
candid example of one of cloud/OSN vulnerabilities.
Moreover, any smart city application is believed
to store, process and analyze users' data. Hence, ev-
ery security solution developed for a smart city envi-
ronment must comply with the undermentioned key
requirements of European Union General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (EU GDPR) (GDPR, 2018) while
handling users' data:
• Personal data should be gathered and processed
only with the consent of the data owner based on
a contract.
• Any technology dependent on user data must pre-
serve user privacy by design.
• The owner of data has the right to know, as to who
has access to his data?
• User data be erased immediately once it is no
longer required.
• The system should be transparent and must log all
the activities concerning user data.
As far as IoT security is concerned, though
blockchain was initially conceived as a financial
transaction (TX) protocol in the form of Bitcoin, but
due to its cryptographic security benefits, researchers
and security analysts are focusing on the blockchain
to resolve security and privacy issues of IoT. Hence,
we believe that a carefully selected blockchain tech-
nology with an insightful business network design can
resolve most of the data integrity and privacy issues of
a smart city.
1.1 Related Work
Security researchers around the world are develop-
ing and investigating ingenious ways to implement
blockchain in the IoT environment. These use cases
aim to take advantage of the inherent benefits of the
blockchain such as decentralized control, immutabil-
ity, cryptographic security, fault tolerance, and capa-
bility to run smart contracts. Recently, researchers
(Michelin et al., 2018) presented a blockchain-based
data sharing framework for a smart city environment.
The framework called "SpeedyChain" focuses on re-
ducing the TX settlement time for real-time applica-
tions such as smart cars and also aims to ensure user
privacy. Moreover, it ensures data integrity, tamper-
resistance, and non-repudiation that are some of the
intrinsic benefits of the blockchain. In another work,
Pradip Kumar and Jong Hyuk proposed a Software
Defined Networking (SDN) and blockchain-based hy-
brid network architecture for a smart city (Sharma
and Park, 2018). The proposed architecture addresses
usual smart city issues including high TX latency,
security and privacy, bandwidth bottlenecks, and re-
quirement of high computational resources. Authors
claim that the proposed model limits the effects of
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node compromise to the local area.
Additionally, researchers (Rahman et al., 2019)
proposed smart contract based sharing economy
services in a smart city. The proposed model
uses Artificial Intelligence (AI) for data analytics
and uses blockchain to store the results. Simi-
larly, Biswas and Muthukkumarasamy (Biswas and
Muthukkumarasamy, 2016) presented an overview
of a blockchain-based security framework for secure
communication between smart city entities. However,
it is not clear that which blockchain platform, and
consensus protocol is used in the smart city applica-
tion?
In another endeavor (Kountché et al., 2017;
Haidar et al., 2017), security researchers have pro-
posed solutions to address various user privacy is-
sues in ITS. Nonetheless, they do not cater for the
challenges of the smart cities such as trustless data
sharing among multiple organizations. Similarly, Ali
Dorri and Raja Jurdak proposed a secure, private and
lightweight architecture of a blockchain-based smart
home application (Dorri et al., 2016; Dorri et al.,
2017). It aims to solve certain blockchain issues such
as computational intensiveness, latency in TX confir-
mation and energy consumption. However, there are
many security concerns that need further explanation
(Makhdoom et al., 2018b). Likewise, authors (Bu-
terin et al., 2014) proposed an Ethereum Blockchain
based mechanism to manage IoT devices (Huh et al.,
2017). Nevertheless, Ethereum Blockchain does not
provide data privacy. Correspondingly, Yu Zhang
and Jiangtao Wen proposed an Ethereum Blockchain
based decentralized electronic business model for the
IoT (Zhang and Wen, 2016). Whereas, the proposed
solution mostly focused on the working of the e-
business model, and thus lacking technical aspects.
Though the research work discussed above has
certainly made some significant contributions towards
blockchain and IoT domain. However, still, there
are many open issues such as preserving data pri-
vacy in a smart city environment, user-defined fine-
grained access control, fast TX settlement, users'
right to forget (concerning data deletion), an in-
centive for users to share their data, etc. There-
fore, to fill the respective research gaps, we pro-
pose “PrivySharing,” a blockchain-based secure and
privacy-preserving framework. The experimental re-
sults have shown that a carefully designed blockchain
solution can ensure user data privacy and integrity in
various network settings as per the wishes of the data
owner. It also effectively protects against false data
injection and Sybil Attacks. Moreover, PrivySharing
complies with some of the significant data security
and privacy requirements of the European Union Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR). The ma-
jor contributions of this paper are:
1. Protection against most of the smart city threats
concerning user data integrity and privacy.
2. Compliance with some of the essential require-
ments of EU GDPR.
3. A blockchain-based solution providing the “right
to forget” concerning user data.
4. A scalable (concerning blockchain size), secure
and an efficient (in terms of energy consump-
tion and computational requirements) data sharing
framework.
5. User-defined fine-grained access control to his/her
data.
6. Providing a transparent and auditable network op-
eration and simultaneously preserving user data
privacy.
7. Secure client access to the blockchain network
through a REST API.
8. A reward system for the users for sharing their
data with the stakeholders/third parties.
1.2 Organization of the Paper
The paper is organized into four sections. Section-
2 presents the detailed architecture, working, reward
mechanism and security analysis of “PrivySharing.”
Experimental results including Access Control List
(ACL) rules and some limitations of the proposed so-
lution are illustrated in Section-3. Finally, the paper




By leveraging data integrity and smart contract fea-
tures of the blockchain, various operations in a
smart city environment can be securely and au-
tonomously performed. Moreover, blockchain also
protects against the adverse effects of server hack-
ing and falsification/modification of permissions (Cui
et al., 2018). No doubt, people in a smart city envi-
ronment feel safe when they have the assurance that
their personal and sensitive data collected by various
devices is fully protected and they have the control
over it (Mazhelis et al., 2016). Such assurance can
only be provided by none other than the blockchain
technology.
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Figure 2: Network participants.
Table 1: List of assets.
Data Types Assets
Health Data











Servicing and Auto Payments
Smart Meter Data
Line Status
Units Consumed and Bill
Consumption Pattern
Surveillance Data







2.1 Smart City Scenario
Let's assume that Alice is living in a smart city where
every aspect of her life is being monitored and con-
trolled through numerous sensors and smart devices.
The critical aspects include personal health, smart liv-
ing, smart car, performance of security apparatus, and
financial TXs to keep the services running. For better
understanding, we have formulated a list of numerous
assets (associated with a specific type of data) that Al-
ice owns (as shown in Table-1). Based on these assets,
Alice can easily decide as to which stakeholder/third-
party needs access to which asset? and what oper-
ation he can perform on that asset? Such a distinc-
tion among the stakeholders/third-parties further as-
sists Alice to plan and control the access to her data.
To implement above mentioned smart city use
case we have used Hyperledger-Fabric (Androulaki
et al., 2018) as the underlying blockchain platform
due to its effective data security and privacy pre-
serving capabilities as compared to other blockchain
platforms (Makhdoom et al., 2018a; Makhdoom
et al., 2018b). The key feature that distinguishes
Hyperledger-Fabric from other blockchain technolo-
gies is that the blockchain ledger consists of two dis-
tinct but related parts, i.e., a blockchain to log the TXs
and a world state (a database such as CouchDB, and
LevelDB) to keep track of the ledger states.
2.2 Basic Terminologies
Some terminologies specific to Hyperledger-Fabric
are:
• Committing Peers. Every peer node in the
Hyperledger-Fabric blockchain is a committing
peer. However, a Committing Peer does not have a
smart contract installed. It just validates and com-
mits a new block of TXs sent by the Ordering Ser-
vice to its copy of the ledger.
• Endorsing Peers. These are special committing
peers with the capability to run the smart con-
tracts. They prepare, sign and endorse the re-
sponses to the TX proposals sent by the clients,
in line with the endorsement policy of the respec-
tive channel (Ch).
• Ordering Service. It is a collection of some peer
nodes that arrange the new TXs in a block and
then broadcast that block to all the peers of the
concerned Ch.
• Membership Service Provider (MSP). On the
one hand, Certificate Authorities (CAs) issue
X.509 certificates to the network entities, while,
on the other, an MSP states that which peer nodes
are members of which organization. Different
MSPs can be used to represent various organiza-
tions or multiple groups within an organization.
Usually, the MSPs are defined at the network, Ch
and local/peer level.
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Figure 3: Smart city blockchain-network architecture.
2.3 Network Architecture
As shown in Figure-2, we have designed a smart city
blockchain network comprising eleven organizations
and their associated peer nodes. Keeping in view
the sharing of different categories of users' data with
different stakeholders and the requirement to ensure
user data privacy and security, the blockchain network
shown in Figure-3 comprises five different data Chs.
Where, Ch1 is used for the sharing of users' health
data, and similarly, Ch2 for smart transportation, Ch3
for smart energy, Ch4 for smart security and Ch5 han-
dles financial data. Hence, these Chs serve to pre-
serve the privacy of user data by securely sharing a
particular type of data with authorized entities only.
The network is initiated by organization-1 (O1), and
is governed by the policy rules specified in the net-
work configuration (NC). NC also controls access to
the smart city network. Similarly, every Ch is reg-
ulated by the policy rules specified in the respective
Channel Configuration (CC). In this setting, Ch1 is
under the control of O2 and O5 and is governed by
CC1. Correspondingly, Ch2 is regulated by CC2, and
so on.
The CC is essential for Ch security, e.g., if the
client application (clientApp) wants to access a SC
on P1, then P1 consults its copy of CC1 to determine
the operations that clientApp can perform. More-
over, there is a separate ledger for every Ch, and all
the peer nodes have to maintain a copy of the ledger
concerning every Ch they are member of. Data in a
Ch is isolated from the rest of the network includ-
ing other Chs. Another important aspect of smart city
blockchain network is the ordering service (ODS),
which is common to all the Chs. Each node in the
ordering service keeps a record of every Ch created
through NC. Regarding CAs, every organization in
the network can have its own CA. But there is one
Root CA (RCA) in the network to establish the root of
trust. As a Proof of Concept (PoC) for PrivySharing,
we are using Hyperledger-Fabric RCA to issue X.509
certificates to all the network entities. These certifi-
cates serve to authenticate the network entities and to
digitally sign the client application TX proposals and
smart contract TX responses. A user accesses the net-
work through a clientApp with a specific X.509 ID,
using a smart contract (SC). It is imperative to men-
tion that only the endorsing peers can see the SC logic
as they have to run the users' TX proposals to prepare
the responses.
To ensure the privacy of critical user data within
a Ch, we adopted a methodology of “Private Data
Collection,” in which the critical private data is sent
directly to the authorized organizations/stakeholders
only. This data is stored in a private database (a.k.a
sideDB) on the authorized nodes, and only the hash
of this data is processed, i.e., endorsed, ordered and
written to the ledgers of every peer on the Ch. The
hash of the data serves as an evidence of the TX, and
it also helps in the validation of the world state. An
important data security feature here is that the order-
ing nodes do not see the private data.
Another important feature of the proposed net-
work architecture is the use of Membership Service
Provider (MSP) at various levels such as network, Ch
and local/peer. The network MSP (NMSP) defines the
members of the network and their admin rights. Addi-
tionally, an NMSP also defines that which RCAs/CAs
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are trusted. On the other hand, the Ch MSPs (CMSP)
outline admin and participatory rights at the Ch level.
A use case for the CMSP is that, e.g., an admin of an
organization wants to instantiate a SC on Ch1, then
by looking at the CMSP the other Ch members can
verify that whether that admin is a part of a specific
organization or not and whether he is authorized to
instantiate the SC on Ch1 or not.
Similarly, a local MSP (LMSP) is defined for ev-
ery client-node/peer. The LMSP associates a peer
with its organization. Here a question may arise that,
what is the difference between CC and a CMSP? A
CC contains the policies that govern that Ch, i.e.,
which all organizations regulate that Ch? Who can
add new members to the Ch? Whereas, a CMSP es-
tablishes the linkage between the nodes and their re-
spective organizations.
Another question may arise that what advantages
do we get by using multiple Chs for different data
types? There are two aspects to this selection; one
is scalability and second is increased privacy of user
data. From the scalability point of view, if there is
only one Ch for all data types, then it means that
all the users will have to store the ledger compris-
ing all TXs that are not even related to them. Hence,
the ledger size will be increasing rapidly thus putting
more strain on storage resources of all the users/peers.
Whereas, in the case of “PrivySharing,” the users will
maintain a ledger that stores only that data which
concerns all the users of that particular Ch. As far
as the privacy of user data is concerned, a data spe-
cific Ch shared only by some of the stakeholders pro-
vides more privacy than a single Ch comprising all the
stakeholders sharing multiple data types.
2.4 Reward Mechanism
PrivySharing incentivizes the users to share their data
with other users, stakeholders or third parties by re-
warding them with a local digital token named “Privy-
Coin.” The users get the incentive based on the num-
ber of days their data is shared with the stakehold-
ers/third parties, as soon as the TX for data sharing is
committed. In this context, if a stakeholder does not
have requisite coins in their account, the TX will fail
(shown in Figure-4). The coins are issued to the users
and the stakeholders by the network admin only.
2.5 Security Analysis
The security, being the core objective of this work has
been assessed at every level of the network operation.
The key aspects are as under:
When the blockchain network is first created, all
Figure 4: Error for not having enough coins.
the peers and orderer organizations are issued with
certificates from respective RCA, or other trusted
CAs. Then, a connection profile is created for all
the network entities including Chs, ODS, organiza-
tions, peers, and CAs. The connection profile de-
fines the complete blockchain network setup. The
key point here is that no other peer (with the in-
tention of endorsing the TXs on a Ch) can join the
network if it is not defined in the connection pro-
file. It is clarified that by peers, we mean commit-
ting, endorsing or ODS peer nodes that maintain the
blockchain network. Whereas, the users/clients ac-
cess the blockchain network through REST API or
clientApps.
To deploy the business network model (PrivyShar-
ing in this case) comprising asset definitions, TX
logic, and ACL rules, on the blockchain, the admin of
responsible organization (O1 in this scenario) requires
a Business Network Card (BNC). BNC is created us-
ing the connection profile of the organization and the
valid public and private key for that admin issued by
the authorized CA, as defined in the connection pro-
file.
The TXs initiated by the clientApps on a specific
Ch are endorsed as per the endorsement policy de-
fined before the start of the business network. The
endorsement policy may include, e.g., which all peers
(with endorsing ability) are required to endorse a TX
on a Ch concerning health data? Correspondingly, a
TX is considered valid, only if the responses of all
the required endorsing peers are same. Hence, only a
valid TX will update the world state.
Another security feature is that before the start of
the business network on the blockchain, business net-
work admins have to be defined and issued with the
certificates by the respective organizations with ad-
min rights on a Ch. These certificates are later used
to create the BNCs for the said admins to access the
business network. Without a valid BNC, no one can
add participants (clients/peers) for an organization.
Moreover, every new client/peer added under an or-
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Figure 5: Validation of assets access control.
ganization is also issued with an ID by the respective
CA with the approval of the business network admin.
These IDs are further used to control access to the
users' profile and assets as per the ACL rules defined
for the specific Ch.
Access to the REST API is secured using the
API key which is required to launch the REST
API. In addition to the API Key, OAuth 2.0 au-
thorization protocol is also deployed to authenticate
the users/stakeholders, authorize access to the REST
server instance, and allow the stakeholders/users to
interact with the business network deployed on the
blockchain. Furthermore, due to the distributed nature
of the smart contracts, the integrity of any business
network deployed on the blockchain is guaranteed.
Similarly, it also protects against hacking of servers,
where, the attackers can change the policy rules, es-
calate access rights, etc. Correspondingly, protection
against application and web vulnerabilities can also
be guaranteed with high probability, as any change in
the smart contract requires installing and instantiat-
ing a new version of the contract on all the endorsing
peers. However, it can not be done discretely. Addi-
tionally, due to a distinction between blockchain and
the world state, an auditable log of TXs and events is
maintained without compromising the privacy of the
users' data.
Considering decentralization aspect, the use of
a dedicated trusted CA, a blockchain admin, and a
business network admin by every organization in the
blockchain network, provides some degree of decen-
tralization as compared to all the admin rights resting
with a single organization.
3 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To validate the security effectiveness of the proposed
solution, we developed a business network model
of health data sharing in a smart city environment
(PrivySharing), i.e., the operation of Ch1 (as shown
in Figure-3), in Hyperledger Composer-Playground
version 0.20. As a PoC, we deployed the business
network architecture of PrivySharing on Hyperledger
Fabric ver 1.2 with one Ch, four committing peers
with endorsing powers and two ordering nodes. We
have used CouchDB as a world state because of its
support for rich queries. It is also validated that access
to users' health data assets is effectively regulated by
numerous ACL rules.
3.1 ACL Rules
These rules enforce that the data asset owners have
access to their assets only, i.e., no user can see data
assets of any other user, and only the data own-
ers can initiate a TX to share their data assets with
other users/stakeholders. Similarly, the data owner
has the right to revoke the sharing of his assets, and
he can also delete his assets when no longer re-
quired without affecting the TX history stored on the
blockchain. Moreover, as all the TXs are recorded
on the blockchain, hence, to increase privacy, a
data owner can see the TX history concerning his
own assets only. Additionally, the valid users can
read and update their own profiles only, and other
users/stakeholders cannot see each other's profile.
Users can also delegate the stakeholders to create as-
sets for the respective users. E.g., Alice (P5) delegates
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her primary medical centre (P2) to create a health data
asset for her. Accordingly, the stakeholders can only
see the data assets that are shared with them or cre-
ated by them. Lastly, all the users/stakeholders can
view their coins only.
The validity of the ACL rules was checked on
both, the Hyperledger Composer-Playground and the
REST API. E.g., As shown in Figure-5a and Figure-
5b, to compare the access rights we have created a
user with admin rights that can view assets of all the
users (blood alcohol level), i.e., P5 and P6 in this case.
Whereas, the user P5 with ID Pid5 can see his assets
only. Moreover, Figure-5c and Figure-5d show that
initially, a user P4 with id Pid4 cannot see any asset,
as no asset is currently shared with him. However,
once user P5 shares his blood alcohol level with P4,
he can see P5's blood alcohol level. Similarly, only
P5 can initiate a TX to share its assets. Whereas, if P4
tries to share the asset of P5 with any other entity then
he will get an error (as shown in Figure-6) as he cur-
rently does not have the right to initiate a data sharing
TX.
3.2 Performance Efficiency
As far as the performance efficiency matters, the use
of multiple Chs to process different data types instead
of a single Ch facilitates simultaneous TX processing,
thus resulting in reduced network latency. Similarly,
Hyperledger-Fabric provides instant TX confirmation
with varying throughput ranging from 1838 to 3560
TXs per second (Androulaki et al., 2018). The TX
throughput depends upon number of factors, such as,
block size, TX size, peer CPU, and number of peers
in the network. Moreover, Hyperledger-Fabric uses
Kafka consensus algorithm which is a voting-based
protocol, that provides consensus finality without any
risk of forks (Hyperledger, 2019). In addition, it has
very low computational and energy requirements as
compared to the PoW-based consensus protocols.
3.3 Limitations and Open Challenges
• Multiple Ledger Storage by the Peers. The
committing peers have to maintain multiple
ledgers, as per the number of channels they are
a member of. This can infer a massive resource
requirement for such nodes in a large smart city
network.
• IoT Device Integrity. IoT data, being the basic
element to provide various seamless services in
a smart city environment necessitates that the de-
vice initially generating and processing that data
should be credible, i.e., only a legitimate and
Figure 6: Validation of TX initiation rights.
clean device should be able to input data to the
blockchain. Whereas, currently there is no such
mechanism to test the integrity of the IoT devices
at run time.
4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
WORK
User data generated by today's smart devices rang-
ing from smart watches to smart cars, smart homes,
auto-pay systems, ITS, etc., is vulnerable to privacy
and security threats. Moreover, users also reserve
the right to manage and control access to the data
they own. Therefore, in this paper, we introduced
“PrivySharing,”, an innovative blockchain-based in-
tegrity and privacy-preserving data sharing mecha-
nism for smart cities. The proposed strategy ensures
that personal/critical user data is kept confidential, se-
curely processed and is exposed to the stakeholders
on the need to know basis as per user-defined ACL
rules embedded in the smart-contracts. Moreover, the
data owners are rewarded for sharing their data with
the stakeholders/third parties. PrivySharing also com-
plies with some of the significant EU GDPR require-
ments.
Though we have presented all the details of the
proposed network architecture and security mecha-
nism, however, as a PoC for this paper, we imple-
mented a part of it. In the future, we aim to extend this
work and incorporate the concept of edge computing
to relieve end nodes from storing multiple ledgers.
We also plan to devise a mechanism for secure in-
tegration of IoT devices with the blockchain.
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